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THE ACADEMY CHOKES ON FOOD BIOTECH,
PUBLIC POLICY SUFFOCATES
By: HENRY I. MILLER, M.D.*
{1} The National Academy of Sciences, under its 1863 congressional charter, is supposed to
be dedicated to “investigate, examine, experiment, and report upon any subject of science or
art whenever called upon to do so by any department of the government.”1 At least insofar as
judging the scientific integrity of governmental regulation of biotechnology is concerned, however,
two recent “expert” committees of the National Research Council (NRC), the research arm of the
Academy, have been plagued by apparent bias, and their recommendations have been dubious.
{2} During the past two years, the Academy has placed its imprimatur on two questionable
analyses of federal biotechnology regulatory policy toward field trials and commercialization of
recombinant DNA-modified plants B the more recent on regulation by the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA), paid for by USDA,2 and another earlier report concerning oversight by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).3
{3} The USDA has the legislative authority, primarily under the Plant Pest Act,4 to regulate the
importation and interstate movement of plants, plant products, and other organisms that may
introduce plant diseases or pests. For example, there has long been a permitting system for
“plant pests,” defined as any organism “which can directly or indirectly injure or cause disease
or damage in or to any plants or parts thereof, or any processed, manufactured, or other
products of plants.”5 The USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) regulations
incorporate an inclusive list of organisms that are or that harbor plant pests.6 This approach is
essentially binary: a plant that an investigator might wish to introduce into the field is either on
the proscribed, inclusive list of plants pests and therefore, requires a permit – or it is exempt.
Further, the method is risk-based, in that the organisms that are required to undergo case-bycase governmental review are an enhanced-risk group, compared to plants not considered to be
plant pests.
{4} For the past fifteen years, however, the USDA also has maintained a parallel regime
focused exclusively on transgenic plants, or those that contain heterologous DNA introduced
with molecular techniques.7 In order to establish this mechanism, in which the scope of what is
regulated is essentially independent of risk, the APHIS tortured the original concept of a plant
pest as something known to be harmful and crafted a new category – a “regulated article,”
defined as “any . . . organism or product altered or produced through genetic engineering
which the Administrator determines is a plant pest or has reason to believe is a plant pest.”8
The phrase “has reason to believe is a plant pest” has been broadly interpreted by the APHIS
to include any organism that includes any amount of DNA from a plant pest,9 even a snippet of
DNA that is incapable of conferring pathogenicity. Two such commonly-used DNA sequences
are the cauliflower mosaic virus S35 promoter sequence and the T-DNA from Agrobacterium
tumefaciens. The USDA’s case-by-case permitting process, costly field test design, and other
requirements have made recombinant DNA-modified plants disproportionately expensive to
develop and test. A field trial with a recombinant DNA-modified plant may be 100 times more
expensive than the same experiment performed with a plant that has an identical phenotype but
that was modified with less precise genetic techniques.10
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{5} The EPA, which regulates pesticides under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA), has contrived its own version of a regulated article. Under the statute, the EPA has
long regulated field tests on areas greater than ten acres, the commercial use of pesticides, and
substances that act as plant regulators, defoliants, dessicants and nitrogen stabilizers.11 In 1994,
the EPA proposed its “plant-pesticide” rule, which brought under the jurisdiction of FIFRA all the
substances that mediate “host plant resistance” to pests, as well as the genetic material needed
to direct the synthesis of these substances, but only if they are introduced with recombinant
DNA techniques. In a final regulation published in 2001, seven years after the rule was first
proposed, in place of “pesticide” the EPA coined the term “plant-incorporated protectants” (PIPs)
to describe what it would regulate.12 These PIPs are defined in a way that places them within the
FIFRA definition of a pesticide, namely, a substance intended to prevent, repel or mitigate any
pest, but only if the plant was constructed by recombinant DNA technology.13 Plants modified
with “conventional breeding” are expressly exempted.14 The concept of a “regulated article” or
“plant incorporated protectant” may be inventive, but it flies in the face of the disciplines of plant
pathology and biology, as well conflicting with the risk-based mandate of the statutes. Moreover,
the USDA’s and the EPA’s regulatory policies fail to acknowledge that genetic modification
is a continuum – from crude, imprecise, traditional practices such as hybridization, intensive
mutagenesis and somaclonal variation, to more precise and predictable recombinant DNA
techniques.
{6} Likewise, they fail to take into consideration the extraordinary overall safety record of
genetic modification in agricultural research throughout both the pre- and post-recombinantDNA eras. Literally millions of genetically altered, but not recombinant DNA-modified, plants are
field tested each year without governmental oversight or strictures: the average plant breeder
of corn, soybean, wheat, or potato, for example, may put 50,000 discrete, new genetic variants
per year into the field, many or all of which may be the product of “wide crosses” hybridization
in which genetic material (including that from weedy or toxigenic plants) has been transferred
across natural breeding barriers.15 The safety record of the tens of thousands of field trials of
recombinant DNA-modified plants that have been performed worldwide, and of the hundreds of
millions acres of cultivated commercial recombinant DNA-modified crops – virtually all of which
have been performed with only the plant breeding practices standard for the parental crop has
been stunning, and the results of risk-assessment experiments have been uniformly negative.16
{7} National and international scientific organizations including, repeatedly, the National Academy
of Sciences and the National Research Council have addressed the question of whether there are
unique risks associated with recombinant DNA-modified organisms with congruent conclusions.
A 1987 white paper from the NAS concluded that there is no evidence of the existence of unique
hazards, either in the use of recombinant DNA techniques or in the movement of genes between
unrelated organisms.17 In 2000, an NRC report on the scientific basis of EPA’s regulation of
recombinant plants concurred “that the properties of a genetically modified organism should be
the focus of risk assessments, not the process by which it was produced.”18 Perhaps the most
comprehensive and unequivocal analysis was the 1989 NRC report on the risks of recombinant
plants and microorganisms, which concluded that “the same physical and biological laws govern
the response of organisms modified by modern molecular and cellular methods and those
produced by classical methods.”19 But this analysis went further, emphasizing that recombinant
DNA techniques are more precise, circumscribed and predictable than other methods:
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Recombinant DNA methodology makes it possible to introduce pieces of DNA, consisting
of either single or multiple genes, that can be defined in function and even in nucleotide
sequence. With classical techniques of gene transfer, a variable number of genes can
be transferred, the number depending on the mechanism of transfer; but predicting the
precise number or the traits that have been transferred is difficult, and we cannot always
predict the phenotype that will result. With organisms modified by molecular methods, we
are in a better, if not perfect, position to predict the phenotypic expression.20
{8} In other words, recombinant technology is a refinement, or improvement, over older, less
precise techniques, and its use generates less uncertainty, which led the committee to make
the strong policy recommendation that “the nature of the process [of genetic modification] is
not a useful criterion for determining whether the product requires less or more oversight.”21
So much for the discriminatory treatment of the USDA’s “regulated articles” and the EPA’s
“plant-incorporated protectants,” the case-by-case review of which is triggered by the use of
recombinant DNA techniques.
{9} In addition to conflicting with scientific consensus, the USDA’s and the EPA’s regulation of
recombinant DNA-modified plants is also incompatible with the two-decade-old part of the United
States’ federal framework that is intended specifically to guide federal agencies’ regulatory
approach to products derived from recombinant DNA-modified organisms. That guidance is
contained in a 1992 statement of policy from the White House Office of Science and Technology
Policy, “Exercise of Federal Oversight Within Scope of Statutory Authority: Planned Introductions
of Biotechnology Products into the Environment,” which was specifically intended to circumscribe
the scope of what should be subject to case by case review.22 It calls for:
[A] risk-based, scientifically sound approach to the oversight of planned
introductions of biotechnology products into the environment that focuses on
the characteristics of the . . . product and the environment into which it is being
introduced, not the process by which the product is created. Exercise of oversight
in the scope of discretion afforded by statute should be based on the risk posed
by the introduction and should not turn on the fact that an organism has been
modified by a particular process or technique.23
{10} On the basis of the exegesis above and the recognition in the 2002 NRC report that
government agencies are in the “difficult position of enforcing a higher environmental
standard for transgenic plants than the standards currently used to regulate the impacts
of other agricultural technologies and practices,”24 one might logically have expected an
endorsement and extension of the 1987 NAS white paper and 1989 NRC report, accompanied
by a recommendation to rationalize the system and to regulate field trials of recombinant and
conventional plants generally no differently, except for those plants with newly-introduced traits
perceived to confer higher risk. Instead, the Academy committee recommends maintaining
the current discriminatory, process-based regulatory system that focuses on plants modified by
recombinant DNA technology.25 It justifies this recommendation by invoking a variety of specious
arguments.
{11} First, the committee invokes “a general assumption that the risks associated with the
introduction of genetic novelty are related to the number of genetic changes and the origin of the
novel genes.”26 This author contends that there is no evidence to support these assumptions, but
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if there were, one would expect to find intense concern about and recommendations for review of
the widespread application of induced-mutation breeding, which has been in common use since
the 1950’s.27 This technique involves exposing crop plants to ionizing radiation or toxic chemicals
to induce random genetic mutations.28 These treatments most often kill the plants or seeds or
cause detrimental genetic changes, but on rare occasions, the result is a desirable mutation,
for example, one producing a new trait in the plant that is agronomically useful, such as altered
height, more seeds, or larger fruit.29 In these cases, breeders lack detailed knowledge about the
nature of the genetic mutation(s) that produced the useful trait, or about the large number of
other mutations that inevitably have occurred in the plant.30 Yet the more than 2200 mutationbred plant varieties from a range of different species that have been marketed over the last half
century have been and remain subject to no formal pre-market regulation.31
{12} Likewise, the committee’s rationale makes it difficult to reconcile the exemption from
regulatory review of wide crosses, hybridization in which embryo rescue or similar techniques are
used to transfer what plant breeders call alien genes from one species or genus to another to
create plants that would not exist in nature.32 Consider, for example, Triticum agropyrotriticum,
a man-made “species” constructed by combining genes from bread wheat and a grass called
quackgrass or couchgrass.33 Possessing all the chromosomes of wheat and one extra whole
genome from the quackgrass B thereby adding tens of thousands of genes – T. agropyrotriticum
was independently produced via wide crosses in the former Soviet Union, Canada, United States,
France, Germany, and China, where at various times it has been grown for both forage and grain.34
These new genetic constructions are exempt from regulation (in spite of at least the theoretical
possibility that the new gene products could make them more weedy, toxic or allergenic than
parental wheat varieties), although the use of recombinant DNA techniques to add a single
quackgrass gene to wheat would precipitate an extensive and expensive pre-market review
from either the USDA or EPA, depending on whether the introduced gene conferred pesticidal
properties.35
{13} As to concerns about the origin of an introduced gene, the scientific consensus holds that
the risk of an introduced gene is related primarily to its function, not its origin.36 Moreover, the
very concept of the “origin” of a gene has become murky with the accumulation and analysis
of DNA sequencing data. Nearly identical DNA sequences and biochemical pathways are found
across vast phylogenetic distances. Searching for homology to the E. coli genome using a high
degree of stringency, for example, reveals gene sequences that are virtually identical in a variety
of organisms, including other bacteria, plants, amphibia, insects and humans.37 This broad
conservation and sharing of gene sequences in nature weakens the argument that the origin, as
opposed to the function – of newly introduced genetic material poses a safety concern (assuming
that the introduced material is well-characterized).
{14} Second, the committee claims there is greater risk from recombinant DNA technology
than other techniques because “a much broader array of phenotypic traits can potentially be
incorporated into plants than was possible two decades ago.”38 But this is a second-order kind of
concern: greater versatility is not the same as enhanced risk. The FDA emphasized this point in
its 1992 policy on foods from “new plant varieties,” which defined certain potentially hazardous
characteristics of new foods, such as the presence of a substance new to the food supply,
increased levels of an endogenous toxin, or the introduction of an allergen, that, if present, would
require greater scrutiny by the agency and which could result in additional testing and labeling or
the exclusion of the food from commerce.39 During the past decade, under this policy thousands
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of foods in U.S. supermarkets that contain byproducts of recombinant organisms have been
marketed, irrespective of whether the plant arose from the application of recombinant DNA or
traditional genetic engineering methods. Other risk-based approaches have been described for
the oversight of field trials of recombinant plants.40 However, in spite of the weight of scientific
consensus and empirical evidence, in a particularly infelicitous circumlocution the panel
concludes:
[T]hat the scientific justification for regulation of transgenic plants is not dependent
on historically set precedents for not regulating conventionally modified plants.
While there is a need to reevaluate the potential environmental effects of
conventionally improved crops, for practical reasons, the committee does not
recommend immediate regulation of conventional crops.41
{15} For practical reasons, indeed! Not a single conventional crop could meet the requirements
being imposed by the USDA on recombinant DNA-modified plants. For a variety of reasons,
conventional plant breeding would grind to a halt if it were subject to the USDA’s regimen for
gene-spliced plants.42 First, the mechanisms for enhancing host plant resistance for conventional
plant breeding are largely unknown because this process uses far less precise and predictable
methods than recombinant DNA.43 Second, conventional plant breeding has led to the
inadvertent introduction of undesirable traits into commercialized products.44 On the basis of
such scientifically unconvincing reasoning, the NAS panel recommends continued compulsory
case-by-case oversight by the USDA of the field trials of all recombinant DNA-modified plants.45
{16} Perhaps one such scientifically indefensible, internally inconsistent report could be
dismissed as an anomaly, but the NRC’s previous report on a parallel subject, namely the
EPA’s oversight of recombinant DNA-modified plants, was similarly flawed.46 The committee
that produced the EPA report chose to ignore crucial aspects of its charge.47 Specifically, the
committee failed “to examine the existing and proposed regulations to qualitatively assess
their consequences for research, development, and commercialization of [recombinant plants
modified to enhance pest-resistance].”48 The committee also failed to “provide recommendations
to address the identified risk/benefits, and, if warranted, for the existing and proposed regulation
of [recombinant plants modified to enhance pest-resistance].”49 This point is essential because
most other analyses have found the EPA’s existing and proposed regulation to be unscientific,
illogical and potentially damaging to agricultural research.
{17} Both the 1987 and 1989 NAS/NRC analyses and the analyses of other academic groups
arrived at conclusions incompatible with the EPA approach. The EPA approach circumscribes
only recombinant DNA-manipulated plants for repeated, redundant case-by-case reviews of field
trials and subjects each gene product and the requisite transgenic DNA to onerous pesticide
registration procedures.50 A large segment of the scientific community has unequivocally
condemned this approach. A 1996 report by eleven scientific societies, representing 80,000
biologists and food professionals, excoriated the EPA’s approach and warned of a number of
negative consequences for agriculture and consumers in the event of the implementation of the
policy of the EPA.51 This report predicted that it would:
[D]iscourage the development of new pest-resistant crops, thereby prolonging the use of
synthetic chemical pesticides; [i]ncrease the regulatory burden for those developing pestresistant varieties of crops, while also increasing federal and state bureaucracy; [l]imit the
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use of biotechnology for the development of pest-resistant plants to those developers that
can pay the increased costs associated with additional regulation…, [h]andicap the United
States in competition for international markets because of U.S. government policy that new
pest-resistant varieties, or products from these varieties, be identified as containing their
own ‘pesticides;’ and [l]imit the use of valuable genetic resources and new technologies to
improve crop protection from pests and diseases.52
{18} The report also offered general principles and recommendations for the oversight of new
plant varieties, including that federal oversight should be based on scientific principles, that it
“should focus on high-probability risk rather than hypothetical or unrecognizable risk,” and that
“the level of risk of a plant variety to the environment or human safety is determined by the
characteristics of the plant, not by the method by which a gene for pest defense is transferred.”53
{19} In 1998 the Council on Agricultural Science and Technology (CAST), an international
consortium of thirty-six scientific and professional groups, reiterated the criticisms of the eleven
societies’ report, characterizing the EPA’s approach as “scientifically indefensible” and stating
that treating gene-spliced plants as pesticides would “undermine public confidence in the food
supply.”54
{20} Therefore, it was extraordinary to find in the 2000 report from the Academy that “the
committee has chosen to take EPA’s proposed rule and the overarching [federal governmental]
coordinated framework as given.”55 This critical decision enabled the committee to produce a
report which accepted a policy that had been censured repeatedly. The EPA’s calls into question
the long, distinguished history of breeding pest resistance into plants that have yielded enormous
improvements in food production and safety, worldwide. This is a policy that if applied to other,
less precise technologies would have thwarted the Green Revolution, which has been, literally, lifegiving to hundreds of millions of starving people in developing countries.
{21} The NRC’s 2000 analysis of the EPA’s regulatory approach contains language that reflects
and endorses the scientific consensus on the nature of risk: “the committee agrees that the
properties of a genetically modified organisms should be the focus of risk assessments, not the
process by which it was produced.”56 This only emphasizes the logical inconsistency of choosing
to ignore the flawed, central, fundamental tenet of the EPA’s approach to regulation; namely,
that the use of recombinant DNA techniques is the trigger to regulation. This tenet violates the
regulatory principle that the degree of scrutiny should be commensurate with risk.
{22} How could the esteemed National Academy of Sciences twice have gone so far wrong in
its assessment of the scientific basis for federal regulatory policy? The game was “fixed.” The
USDA committee was stacked with members known to harbor antagonism or skepticism toward
biotechnology; moreover, unlike the 1987 and 1989 NRC committees, it contained few fellows
of the Academy. Of the twelve members on the committee, only two were Academy fellows. The
EPA committee contained no Academy fellows, save the chairman.
{23} The committee members and invited reviewers for the EPA report were selected with
disregard for apparent conflicts of interest and bias. Stanley Abramson, Fred Betz and Morris
Levin, three members of the twelve-person committee, are former EPA staff who helped to
craft and defend a variety of process-based regulatory policies at the agency. Another member,
Rebecca Goldburg, has produced a succession of anti-biotechnology tracts over the past decade
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and a half. Moreover, during the formal review process, the document was reviewed by another
former senior EPA official, Lynn Goldman, who had been instrumental in crafting and defending
the policy in question, and by Jane Rissler, an intractable anti-biotechnology activist. Three
members of the USDA committee, Chairman Fred Gould, David Andow and Norman Ellstrand,
are long-time skeptics about the safety of recombinant plants and have consistently advocated
process-based regulation. Another USDA committee member, Ignacio Chapela, is the author of a
discredited article on supposed contamination of the teosinte gene pool by transgenes from Btmaize banned in Mexico.57
{24} The report on EPA oversight had the desired result.58 After seven years of opposition from
the scientific community to the unscientific proposed rule, the Academy report offered sufficient
cover for the EPA to issue a final rule.59 The prestige of the Academy attached to the report on the
USDA’s regulation, virtually assuring the permanence of stultifying, process-based regulation at
the USDA that will unnecessarily inflate the costs of research and the commercialization of new
plant varieties.
{25} The excessive regulation acts as a market-entry barrier to smaller competitors unable to
bear inflated regulatory costs. In contrast, the handful of large agribusiness companies currently
involved in agricultural biotechnology will actually benefit from such extensive and expensive EPA
and USDA regulatory regimes. Academic researchers, the ultimate engine for innovation, are the
most severely affected victims of excessive, ill-conceived regulation. Operating on small budgets,
their ability to perform field trials of recombinant plants and microorganisms is markedly
restricted.
{26} The late DeWitt “Hans” Stetten, an esteemed NIH researcher and administrator, once wrote
that “[s]cience cannot tolerate the man who takes lightly his moral obligation to report strictly
what is true.”60 It appears, however, that on certain high-profile, politically-charged subjects, the
National Academy of Sciences lately has chosen to exempt itself from that axiom.
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